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Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and
Burden of Proof
Recently, the debate over the application of the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act' ("RICO") to defendants
not connected to organized crime has intensified.2 According to
the language of the Act, anyone can be a defendant under RICO if
he: 1) uses or invests money obtained through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or collection of an unlawful debt in an enterprise
which affects commerce;3 2) acquires or maintains, through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt, an
1 "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1982).
2 See, e.g., "RICO" Running Amok in Board Rooms, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at 6, 20,
col. 1 ("[A] statute, enacted primarily for one purpose, ends up being applied in ways
lawmakers never clearly foresaw, creating litigation on a scale judges never anticipated.");
Skinner & Tone, Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 30, 1984, at 22, 24,
col. I ("[I]t is now clear that legitimate businesses with no connection to organized crime
have much to fear from the broad scope . . . of the RICO statute."). But see Horn,Judicial
Plague Sweeps United States 'Resultorientitis' Infects Civil RICO Decisions, Nat'l LJ., May 23, 1983,
at 31, col. 1.
Although businesses not connected to organized crime have argued against the appli-
cation of RICO to them as defendants, such businesses have not hesitated to sue under
RICO. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus. 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984)
(public accounting firm sued their client for mail and wire fraud in attempting to induce the
firm to issue a favorable audit); FDIC Using Racketeering Law in Suit Seeking Damages in Bank
Failure Case, Wall St.J., Apr. 9, 1985, at 16, col. 1 ("When bankers have been at the fore-
front to limit RICO only to apply to real racketeering, it's kind of an embarrassment that a
banking agency itself is using RICO.").
RICO's "legislative history clearly demonstrates that. . .[Congress] intended [RICO]
to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and
its economic roots." Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302 (1983). "[T]he major
purpose of. . . [RICO was] to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981). Nevertheless, Congress did
not "confine... RICO [to] only the infiltration of legitimate business." Id. at 590 (empha-
sis in original). "[R]ejected [too, has been the] notion that . .. [RICO] applies only to
organized crime in the classic 'mobster' sense." United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026,
1030 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). See also Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Inter-
state Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1984) (cases cited and followed).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has declined to limit other federal statutes to defendants
connected to organized crime. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 46 (1979) (Travel Act);
United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978) (Hobbes Act); United States v.
Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1966) (18 U.S.C. § 1953, a federal statute proscribing the
transportation of betting materials in interstate commerce).
3 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquis-
tion of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce . . ..
interest in such an enterprise,4 3) conducts or participates in the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity5 or
collection of an unlawful debt,6 or 4) conspires to engage in any of
the foregoing activities.7
RICO's enforcement mechanisms include criminal and civil
sanctions that may be sought by the government8 as well as a pri-
vate claim for relief for any person injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of a violation of the statute. 9 The private claim for
relief allows a plaintiff to recover treble damages and reasonable
attorneys' fees in federal court. Twenty-two states have similar
statutes.10
4 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activ-
ities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
5 To engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, a person must commit at least two
predicate acts within a 10-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). "Pattern" means "not
isolated" or "sporadic" but "continu[ous] and related." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 158 (1969); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir.) (not related
to each other, but to the affairs of the enterprise), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980). "Racke-
teering activities" include "four broad, but not mutually exclusive categories: 1) violence;
2) provision of illegal goods and services; 3) corruption in the labor movement or among
public officials; and 4) comniercial and other forms of fraud." Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud
Action in Context. Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 300-06 (1982).
See note 24 infra. For an exhaustive listing, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire
to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
8 Remedies afforded to the government under the criminal provision of § 1963(a) in-
clude a fine of not more than $25,000 or imprisonment of not more than 20 years, or both,
and forfeiture of any interest acquired through a racketeering activity or any interest afford-
ing a source of influence over any enterprise conducted in violation of the statute. Section
1964(a) creates a civil cause of action in the government. In addition to traditional civil
remedies, the government has various forms of equitable relief, including, inter alia, the
power to order divestiture of any interest in an enterprise and the power to impose restric-
tions on future activities or investments of a defendant.
9 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) (1982) provides: "Any person injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appro-
priate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section 1962 is set forth in
notes 3, 4, 6, and 7 supra.
Whether a private plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief is unclear. For a discussion of
this issue, see Johnson, Preditors Rights: Multiple Remedies for Wall Street Sharks Under the Securi-
ties Laws and RICO, 10J. CORP. L. 3 (1984); Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil
Causes of Action in RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 945 (1984).
10 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to 13-2316 (1978 and West Supp. 1984-85); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 186-186.8 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to 18-17-109
(Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 53-393 to 53-403 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-3401 to 26-3414 (1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to 842-12 (1976); IDAHO CODE
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Generally, plaintiffs ignored the possibilities of civil RICO
claims" until the recent civil RICO litigation against such "legiti-
mate" 2 businesses as Shearson/American Express,' 3 E.F. Hutton
& Co., 14 Lloyd's of London,' 5 and Merrill Lynch.' 6 Troubled by
this use of RICO, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,' 7 limited the scope of civil RICO by
requiring that the plaintiff allege both an injury distinct from the
§§ 18-7801 to 18-7805 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, §§ 1651-60 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-85) (limited to narcotics); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1 to 35-45-6-2, 34-4-
30.5-1 to 34-4-30.5-6 (Burns Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1351-56 (West Supp.
1985) (limited to narcotics); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to 97-43-11 (Lawyers Co-op
1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 207.350 to 207.520 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to 2C:41-
6.2 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to 30-42-6 (Michie Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to 12.1-06.1-08 (Smith Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166-715 to
166-735 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1 to
7-15-11 (Michie Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to 76-10-1608 (Smith Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.010 to 9A.82.901 (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 946.80 to 946.87 (West Supp. 1984-85).
11 One commentator noted that only 13 cases involving civil RICO had been published
by 1981. See Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1101, 1101 n.7 (1982).
12 Labelling a business as "legitimate" before resolution of the allegations against it
begs the question. If such a business is held liable, it cannot be "legitimate" in the literal
sense of the word, at least in regard to the corrupt transaction.
For an example of "legitimate" businesses, including Fortune 500 corporations, partic-
ipating in illegitimate activities, such as money laundering, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
AND MONEY LAUNDERING 11-12, 33-34 (1984) (Interim Report to the President and the At-
torney General).
13 Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
14 Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
15 Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
16 Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich.
1983).
17 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). A divided panel affirmed dismissal of Sedima on July 25,
1984 for failure to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (civil RICO). On July 26 and 27,
1984, divided panels similarly affirmed dismissal of Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1984), and Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984).
Sedima involved a joint venture between the plaintiff-appellant Sedima, S.P.R.L.
(Sedima), a Belgian supplier of aerospace and defense industries, and defendant-appellee
Imrex Company (Imrex), a New York exporter of aviation parts, to provide electronic com-
ponent parts for a NATO subcontractor in Belgium. Sedima solicited orders for parts
which Imrex obtained and shipped to Europe. Sedima alleged that Imrex and defendant-
appellee officers of Imrex sent it inflated copies of purchase orders, invoices, and credit
memoranda, thereby falsely increasing its reimbursement. In addition to its other claims,
the plaintiff alleged three counts under RICO: one count asserting a RICO conspiracy,
unlawful under § 1962(d), and two counts alleging that the fraudulent purchase orders,
invoices and credit memoranda constituted a pattern of racketeering, unlawful under
§ 1962(c). The underlying predicate offenses which allegedly constituted the pattern of
racketeering activity included violations of the Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) and
the Wire Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the
three RICO counts for failure to allege an injury distinct from the injuries resulting from
the alleged predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574
F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the
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injuries caused by the predicate offenses18 and that the defendant
had been previously convicted of an underlying predicate offense
or criminal RICO. 19
This note addresses the prior criminal conviction requirement.
Part I analyzes the Second Circuit's interpretation of civil RICO as
requiring a prior conviction of the defendant. Part II explores the
burden of proof requirement for establishing that, in the absence of
a prior criminal conviction, the defendant committed the underly-
ing predicate acts. Based upon the language and legislative history
of RICO, analogous civil actions, and policy concerns, this note
concludes that the Second Circuit should not have established a
prior criminal conviction requirement, and that in proving criminal
activity, the correct burden of proof under civil RICO is a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
court's reasoning. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 503-04. In addition, the court imposed, sua sponte,
the requirement of a prior criminal conviction. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
Sedima and Bankers Trust were 2 to 1 decisions. Furman was a 3 to 0 decision. The panel
in Furman, however, disagreed with the racketeering injury requirement imposed by Sedina
and Bankers Trust, but was compelled to affirm dismissal because of precedent. Furman, 741
F.2d at 533. Neither Bankers Trust nor Furman held that a prior criminal conviction was a
condition precedent to a civil action.
Several months later, the Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), rejected the Second Circuit's racketeering
injury requirement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Sedima and Haroco on
the issue of a racketeering injury requirement. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co, 741 F.2d 482
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985); Haroco v. American Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985). Certiorari was
also granted on the issue of whether a prior criminal conviction is a prerequisite to a civil
RICO action.
18 741 F.2d at 494.
19 Id. at 496. The prior criminal conviction requirement imposed by the Second Circuit
in Sedima contradicts previous Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions that held that no prior
criminal conviction is required before a private civil suit may be instituted. See Bunker
Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 (7th Cir. 1983); USACO
Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982). It is also inconsis-
tent with the Second Circuit's own precedent in United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) that held an indictment for a predicate
offense was not required for a RICO criminal prosecution. The prior criminal conviction is
also contrary to state court decisions interpreting state legislation comparable to RICO. See
Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co., 450 So. 2d 1157, 1164 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (private civil suit); Commonwealth v. Taraschi, 475 A.2d 744, 749 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (criminal prosecution);James v. Brink & Erb, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 414, 416 n.3 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (private civil suit).
Several federal district courts have adopted the Second Circuit's requirement of a prior
criminal conviction. See McCarthy v. Pacific Loan, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 137, 140 (D. Hawaii
1984); Gardner v. Surnamer, 599 F. Supp. 477, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The Second Circuit,
however, refused to apply its own requirement in a civil RICO action based on the predi-
cate act of usury. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, No. 84-7221, slip op.
(2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1985).
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I. Prior Criminal Conviction
In Sedima, the Second Circuit stated that it imposed the prior
criminal conviction requirement to resolve the question of what
burden of proof would be necessary to prove criminal activity in a
civil RICO action. The court believed that Congress did not con-
sider the question, but would have required a prior criminal convic-
tion upon such consideration.20 A close examination of the text,
legislative history, and policy considerations reveals, however, that
the requirement is not justified.
A. Examination of the Text
The starting point for interpreting a statute is to examine the
language of the statute.2 1 Absent ambiguity or a clearly expressed
contrary legislative intent, the language of the statute is conclu-
sive. 22 RICO does not expressly require that a private plaintiff
show that the civil defendant had been previously convicted under
criminal RICO or for one of the predicate acts. 23 The Second Cir-
cuit in Sedima, however, suggests that Congress' use of the words
"chargeable," "indictable," and "offense" to describe acts fulfilling
the racketeering injury requirement, 24 indicates that Congress in-
tended that the defendant be convicted before a civil action could
commence.25
20 741 F.2d at 501. It is hard to imagine that the court did not consider that this re-
quirement would reduce the number of civil RICO actions considerably, thereby reducing
the workload in federal courts. See notes 78-79 infra and accompanying text.
21 Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct 296, 299 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)).
22 Id. See also Garcia v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 479, 483 n.3 (1984); Blum v. Stenson,
104 S. Ct. 1541, 1548 (1984).
23 See the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d), 1964(c) set forth in notes 3, 4, 6, 7
and 9 supra. The state versions of RICO do not expressly require a prior criminal convic-
tion before either a criminal or a civil suit may be brought by the government or a private
party. See note 10 supra.
24 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) provides in relevant part:
"[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dan-
gerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under [various provisions of
the United States Code, such as provisions dealing with counterfeiting, mail fraud,
wire fraud, obstruction ofjustice, interference with commerce, robbery, or extor-
tion, unlawful welfare fund payments, interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty]; (C) any act which is indictable under [provisions of the United States Code
dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations, and em-
bezzlement from union funds]; or (D) any offense involving. . . fraud in the sale of
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy-
ing, selling or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable
under any law of the United States.
(emphasis added).
25 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499 ("[T]hese terms . . . speak along criminal rather than civil
lines.").
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This suggestion, however, ignores the fundamental principle
of statutory construction that words should be interpreted accord-
ing to their ordinary, contemporary, or common meaning. 26 The
Oxford English Dictionary defines "indictable" as "[liable to be in-
dicted or accused of a crime," 27 "chargeable" as "[c]apable of be-
ing, or liable to be, charged," 28 and "offense" as a "breach of law,
duty, propriety, or etiquette." 29 Thus, according to their common
meaning, the words of the statute do not require conviction or even
indictment.30 They merely incorporate by reference the elements
of state and federal offenses. Further, the use of the word "convic-
tion" in other sections of the Act 31 suggests that Congress knew
how to use the word, but consciously did not employ it in the rele-
vant section of the statute.
The plain meanings of the words "chargeable," "indictable,"
and "offense" should control, unless that interpretation would lead
to absurd results or would thwart the obvious purpose of the stat-
ute.32 Neither justification applies to civil RICO. Absence of a
prior criminal conviction requirement does not lead to absurd re-
sults. Other federal criminal statutes, including the Travel Act33
and Gun Control Act,3 4 require proof of conduct constituting an-
other crime, but do not require conviction of that crime.35 Further,
26 See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
27 V THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 209 (1933).
28 II THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 286 (1933).
29 VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 76 (1933).
30 See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975). See also Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) ("All that need be
determined is that they are acts which, if proved by the government in a criminal proceed-
ing, would subject the violator to criminal sanctions.").
31 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982) (provision of RICO dealing with seizure); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e)(1) (1982) (provision of the Organized Crime Control Act dealing with sentenc-
ing). See also lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975) ("The [Organized Crime
Control] Act is a carefully crafted piece of legislation.").
32 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). On a number of occasions,
the Supreme Court has declined to follow the plain meaning of statutory language. In
United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1931), for example, the Court restricted the
words "all personal property whatsoever" under a forfeiture provision of the National Pro-
hibition Act to only that personal property incident to the tax evasion at which the statute
was aimed. The Court found that to include all personal property would penalize possess-
ing articles having no relation to the offense. Similarly, in United States v. Katz, 271 U.S.
354 (1926), the government contended that § 10 of the National Prohibition Act, which
provides that "no person shall manufacture . .. any liquor without making at the time a
permanent record thereof. . . "applied, not only to people allowed under government
permits to manufacture, sell, or transport liquor under the Act, but also to bootleggers.
The Court found, however, that the literal construction of this clause was unreasonable
because it would add to the crime of manufacturing, selling, or transporting, a second of-
fense of failing to make a record of one's own wrongdoing. Id. at 362.
33 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982).
34 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1982).
35 See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-96 (1969) (Travel Act), United
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lack of a prior criminal conviction requirement is not contrary to
RICO's purpose of providing new legal tools to eradicate organized
crime.36 On the other hand, requiring a prior criminal conviction
restricts application of these new legal tools and frustrates Con-
gress' stated purpose in enacting RICO. The legislative history of
RICO also supports the view that a prior criminal conviction is not
required before civil recovery.37
B. Legislative History
In Sedima, the Second Circuit suggests that had Congress con-
sidered the question it would have required a prior conviction of
the predicate crimes as a prerequisite to civil RICO actions. 38 The
debates reveal, however, that Congress considered the question,
but consciously decided to go forward with a broadly drafted stat-
ute. In support of an amendment authorizing treble damages to
deter frivolous civil actions by private plaintiffs, Congressman
Mikva objected to RICO's breadth precisely because a conviction of
the predicate offenses was not required for the act to constitute
racketeering. 39 No one contradicted Congressman Mikva's descrip-
tion of the breadth of the statute and his amendment was de-
feated. 40 In addition, Congress purposely modeled RICO after the
antitrust statutes, which do not require a criminal conviction. 4' Had
States v. Ramirez, 482 F.2d 807, 813-14 (2d Cir.) (Gun Control Act), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1070 (1973).
36 RICO defines its purpose on the face of the statute:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process, by establishing
new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
37 See notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
38 741 F.2d at 502.
39 116 CONG. REC. 35,342 (1970) ("Now, there need not be a conviction under any of
these laws for it to be racketeering.") Congressman Mikva's proposed amendment was de-
feated. Id. at 35,343.
40 Id. at 35,343.
41 S. REP. No. 617, supra note 5, at 81 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 56-60 (1970). See also 113 CONG. REC. 17,999 (1967) (Remarks by Sen. Hruska upon
introduction of RICO legislation) ("A full range of criminal and civil sanctions which now
exist in our antitrust laws would be made available to enforcement officials and to persons
adversly affected by such investments."); 113 CONG. REC. 17,947 (1967) (Remarks by Rep.
Poff upon introduction of RICO legislation) ("[The bills] are intended to activate the anti-
trust laws in a more vital way and focus their application upon the problem of organized
crime.").
RICO was enacted partly in response to a study on organized crime of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The commission recom-
mended that private businesses develop strategies to prevent and uncover illegal business
tactics of organized crime. It also suggested that private civil proceedings be used to stop
organized crime from engaging in illegal trade practices and antitrust violations. TASK
FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
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Congress intended to impose a prior conviction requirement, a rad-
ical departure from the analogous antitrust laws, it would certainly
have made its intent explicit.
C. Analogous Civil Actions That Require Proof of a Crime
But Not Conviction
By imposing the conviction requirement, the Sedima court over-
looked analogous civil actions that are based upon prior criminal
activity, but that do not require a prior conviction.42 Absence of a
prior criminal conviction requirement in such actions was not al-
ways the rule. The history of these actions reveals why the prior
conviction requirement was abandoned and why it should not be
adopted in civil RICO actions.
Early English common law merged a private right of action for
injuries caused by a felony into the higher offense against society
and left the private individual without redress.43 Later cases merely
suspended the private right of action until the criminal proceedings
were resolved. 44 This rule was based on the civic duty of prosecut-
ing felonies that England imposed on its citizens. Seeking redress
for private injuries before criminal prosecution was thought to prej-
udice public vindication and was generally prohibited.45 England
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 23 (1967) ("techniques . . . especially valuable because
they require a less rigid standard of proof of violation than the guilt-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt requirement of criminal law").
42 See notes 50-56 infra and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61, sub nom. Higgins' Case, Noy,
18, 74 Eng. Rep. 989 (1606) (beating to death of a servant constitutes an offense to the
crown which "drowns" the master's cause of action for battery and loss of service); Mark-
ham v. Cobbe, Noy, 82, 74 Eng. Rep. 1049 (1625) (dicta) (civil action for trespass merged
into offense of burglary). For a general discussion of this rule, see 1 HALSBURY'S LAWs 16,
at 11-14 (3d ed. 1952).
Other theories advanced to support the rule include: 1) that private actions for dam-
ages interfered with the royal prerogative and 2) that since at ancient English common law,
felonies were punishable by death and forfeiture of one's goods and land to the Crown, the
civil remedies were useless, for nothing remained in the convict's estate from which to sat-
isfy a judgment. See Boston and Worcester R.R. v. Dana, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 83, 96-97
(1854).
44 Smith v. Selwyn, 3 K.B. 98, [1914-1915] All E.R. Rep. 229 (1914) (Action for dam-
ages for rape stayed until after criminal proceedings). See also Midland Ins. Co. v. Smith, 6
Q.B.D. 561 (1881).
45 Gimson v. Woodfull, 2 C. & P. 41, 43, 172 Eng. Rep. 19, 20 (1825) ("[Y]ou must do
your duty to the public, before you seek a benefit to yourself."). See also Abbott v. Refuge
Assurance Co., [1962] 1 Q.B. 432, [1961] 3 All. E.R. 1074 (1961) (Because the law imposed
a duty to prosecute before commencement of civil proceedings, commencement of criminal
proceedings for forgery did not constitute malice, even though the purpose of the proceed-
ing was to enable recovery in a civil action.).
Nevertheless, English courts did not apply the rule where the injured person had a
reasonable excuse for not prosecuting, for example, when the offender had already been
brought to justice by another, Re Shepherd, Ex parte Ball, [1879] 10 Ch. D. 667; when the
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abolished the rule by statute in 1967.46
Some American jurisdictions initially applied the English
rule. 47 Courts and legislatures, however, soon abolished the rule
because its principal justification did not exist in this country. The
existence of public prosecutors in America obviated the need to en-
courage public prosecution of crimes.48
Thus, many modern civil actions that implicate criminal activity
do not require conviction of the crime as a prerequisite for civil
recovery. 49 Examples include the False Claims Act, 50 Internal Rev-
enue Code provisions,51 and antitrust statutes.52 Similarly, under
state law, many civil actions that require proof of a conduct consti-
tuting a crime do not require a conviction for that crime before au-
thorizing civil recovery. For example, in a civil action to recover
proceeds of an insurance policy, the insured's prior acquittal of ar-
son does not prevent an insurance company from asserting arson as
a defense.53 Criminal conviction of bribery is also not a prerequi-
site to cancelling a government contract on the grounds of brib-
ery.54 Similarly, various tort actions that implicate conduct
offender had died, Wickham v. Gatrill, 2 Sm. & Giff. 353, 65 Eng. Rep. 433 (1854); or when
the police had decided not to prosecute, Oloro v. Ali, [1965] 3 All E.R. 829.
46 Criminal Law Act, 1967, ch. 58, § 1; 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 552 (3d ed. 1968).
47 Boston and Worcester R.R. v. Dana, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 83, 98-99 (1854). See, e.g.,
Bell's Adm'r v. Troy, 35 Ala. 184, 204 (1859) (termination of criminal prosecution of arson
required before civil action for damages could be maintained); Keyser v. Rodgers, 50 Pa.
275, 281 (1865) (suspension of civil suit for trover suspended until criminal prosecution of
larceny terminated).
48 Boston & Worchester R.R. v. Dana, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 83, 99 (1854).
49 Moreover, acquittal or dismissal of criminal proceedings does not dispose of a subse-
quent civil action against the same defendant by collateral estoppel or res judicata. See
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1104 (1984) ("[A]n ac-
quittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves
the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.").
For an analysis of double jeopardy issues concerning RICO, see Note, RICO and the
Predicate Offenses: An Analysis of Double Jeopardy and Verdict Consistency Problems, 58 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 382 (1982).
For an analysis of collateral estoppel issues concerning RICO, see Pickholz, Collateral
Estoppel and Civil RICO Actions, in 3 RICO: THE SECOND STAGE M-1 (1984).
50 See, e.g., Murray & Sorenson, Inc. v. United States, 207 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1953)
(acquittal in criminal prosecution for conspiracy to defraud did not bar subsequent civil
action against the same defendants to recover forfeitures and double damages under the
False Claims Act).
51 See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1938) (acquittal in a criminal
proceeding for wilful attempt to evade a tax did not bar collection of a 50% addition to the
tax in a civil action).
52 See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912) (Sher-
man Antitrust Act) ("An imperative rule that the civil suit must await trial of the criminal
action might result in injustice or take from the statute a great deal of its power.").
53 See, e.g., McSweeney v. Utica Fire Ins. Co., 224 F.2d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1955) (Acquit-
tal was not admissible in a civil trial to prove homeowner's innocence of arson.).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 146 (1966) (acquit-
tal of charges claiming violation of the Anti-Kickback Act did not bar the right to cancel a
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constituting a crime, including wrongful death 55 and assault and
battery,56 may be brought without a prior conviction of the defend-
ant on a criminal charge.
As these examples illustrate, American courts traditionally
have refused to require either criminal convictions or institution of
criminal proceedings as a prerequisite to civil actions. The ration-
ale behind the English rule requiring predicate convictions does
not apply to civil suits requiring proof of a crime in the United
States. As such, the old English rule does not serve as precedent
for requiring conviction prior to a civil RICO action.
Accordingly, an examination of the text, legislative history, and
analogous civil actions that implicate conduct constituting a crime
does not support the Sedima court's imposition of a prior criminal
conviction requirement in RICO. In addition, significant policy
considerations weigh heavily against such a requirement.
D. Policy Considerations
By imposing the conviction. requirement, the Sedima court also
overlooked important policy considerations, including: 1) the
existence of sufficient legal tools to prevent frivolous suits, 2) the
inappropriateness of restricting a statute because of workload con-
cerns, 3) the inappropriateness of denying a plaintiff access to court
because of matters that preclude conviction, but that are unrelated
to the validity of the civil claim, and 4) the detrimental effect of such
a requirement on the criminal justice system.
Critics claim that RICO encourages frivolous lawsuits because
it offers a private plaintiff the advantages of a federal forum and the
government contract because of the alleged kickback); Pan Am. Petroleum and Transp. Co.
v. United States, 273 U.S. 456, 500 (1927) (to void contracts and leases because of bribery,
it was not necessary to prove that the transaction constituted bribery under the criminal
code).
55 See, e.g., Vosnos v. Perry, 43 Ill. App. 3d 834, 837, 357 N.E.2d 614, 616 (1976); Small
v. Rockfeld, 66 NJ. 231, 245, 330 A.2d 335, 343 (1974).
Cf Burns v. United States, 200 F.2d 106, 107 (4th Cir. 1952) (acquittal of murder
charges in a criminal proceeding is not binding in a civil case to determine whether defend-
ant is entitled to receive insurance proceeds on decedent's life); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 2-803(e) (1983) (conviction of felonious and intentional killing is not required for deter-
mining the effect of homicide on intestate succession, wills, joint assets, life insurance, and
beneficiary designations); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF REsrTrrsoN § 187 comment f
(1937) (conviction of murder is not required before imposition of a constructive trust for
murder of decedent).
56 See, e.g., Parker v. Lanier, 82 Ga. 216,218-19, 8 S.E. 57, 58 (1888); Nowlan v. Griffin,
68 Me. 235, 235-36 (1878); Barr v. Post, 56 Neb. 698, 707, 77 N.W. 123, 126 (1898);
Harford v. Carroll, 21 R.I. 515, 516, 45 A. 259, 259 (1900). But see Horby v. King, 13 NJ.
Super 395, 400, 80 A.2d 476, 478 (1951) (public duty to initiate a criminal proceeding for
rape before instituting a civil action for damages).
Cf Warren v. Byrne, 699 F.2d 95, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1983) (Dismissal of criminal charges
of trespass does not bar relitigation of the trespass issue in a civil action.).
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prospect of treble damages and attorneys' fees. 57 In support of the
prior criminal conviction requirement, the Sedima court remarked
that, whereas prosecutorial discretion and special RICO guidelines
guard against overly broad use of criminal RICO, 58 no comparable
restrictions circumscribe the use of civil RICO.59
Nevertheless, restrictions that prevent the overly broad use of
other civil remedies will equally and adequately prevent frivolous
civil RICO claims. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide various means to discourage meritless litigation. For example,
Rule 1160 authorizes a court to order a litigant, who acts in bad faith
in conducting litigation, to pay his opponent's expenses, including
fees. As recently amended, Rule 1 1 states that when an attorney
signs a document, he certifies that he has read the document, that
he believes, after reasonable inquiry, that it is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument to extend the law, and that he is not
using it for an improper purpose.6 1 An attorney and his client as-
serting a civil RICO claim may be sanctioned under this rule for
bringing a RICO action unwarranted by law or asserted merely for
settlement purposes.
Second, attorney rules of ethics also guard against meritless
RICO civil suits. Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
an attorney may be subject to discipline for filing a suit on behalf of
his client merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injur-
ing another;62 or knowingly advancing a claim or defense unwar-
ranted by existing law, unless he can make a good faith argument
57 Skinner & Tone, supra note 2, at 24 ("RICO is an attractive vehicle for plaintiffs to
assert garden variety fraud claims, obtain a federal fourm and seek treble damages....
Civil plaintiffs cannot be expected to exercise, and have not exercised ... discretion.").
58 United States Attorneys' Staff Manual, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, RICO
Guidelines (Jan. 30, 1981). These guidelines, however, are not judicially enforceable.
Haley v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (W.D. Mo. 1975) ("simply a 'housekeeping
provision' of the Department ofJustice"). The guidelines also do not apply to state prosec-
tuors. See also note 64 infra.
59 741 F.2d at 497.
60 FED. R. CIv. P. 11. Other federal rules that guard against the institution of meritless
suits include FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (fraud must be pleaded with particularity); FED. R. Civ. P.
12(e) (motion for a more definite statement); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (signature of party or
attorney certifies that discovery requests, responses, and objections are warranted by ex-
isting law or good faith argument otherwise, are not used for improper purpose, and are
not unreasonable or unduly burdensome); and FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment). See
also Rodes, Ripple & Mooney, Sanctions Imposable for Violations of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 64-65, Federal Judicial Center (1981).
61 The rule was amended to reduce courts' reluctance to impose sanctions for pleading
and motion abuses. "Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses
and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive
tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or de-
fenses." FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee note.
62 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1).
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for its extension, modification, or reversal. 63
Finally, defendants subjected to meritless RICO civil actions
may sue RICO plaintiffs under tort theories of abuse of process and
wrongful civil proceedings.6 Under the theory of wrongful civil
proceedings, a defendant in a frivolous private RICO action may
sue the private plaintiff if he can prove that the private plaintiff ma-
liciously brought the action without probable cause, that the RICO
claim terminated in the defendant's favor, and that the defendant
suffered injury from the meritless action. 65 A defendant in a frivo-
lous private RICO suit, however, may have a better chance of recov-
ering under abuse of process, which requires proving only a wilful
use of a legal process for an improper purpose. 66 Abuse of process
would provide recourse against an attorney or client who, for exam-
ple, commences a private RICO action merely to force a nuisance
settlement.6 7
Thus, sufficient rules and procedures exist to prevent meritless
RICO actions.6 8 Meritless lawsuits arise because the legal commu-
63 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY DR 7-102(A)(3).
64 The tort of wrongfil civil proceedings is also termed malicious prosecution even
though involving a civil action. L. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (5th
ed. 1984).
However, a prosecutor acting within the scope of his duties, enjoys absolute immunity
from civil suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under the common law theory of
malicious prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976). Accordingly, the
Second Circuit's statement in Sedima that prosecutorial discretion based on the Department
ofJustice guidelines prevents abuses of criminal RICO is illusory because 1) The Depart-
ment ofJustice guidelines are not judicially enforceable against federal prosecutors and are
not even applicable to state prosecutors and 2) federal and state prosecutors enjoy immu-
nity from civil suits for abusive or unlawful prosecutions. See note 58 supra.
65 L. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 64, § 120. A large minority of jurisdictions
require, however, that the plaintiff in the wrongful civil proceedings action allege a special
injury, such as interference to his person or property. Id. Such a requirement may reduce
the chances of recovery by a RICO defendant who alleges as his only injury, damage to his
reputation by being stigmatized a "racketeer."
66 Id. § 121.
67 Cf. Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980) (A complaint and summons
charging a doctor with malpractice were misused by an attorney for the ulterior purpose of
coercing a settlement. The following facts supported the finding that the commencement
of the suit by the attorney was abuse of process: 1) the attorney's failure to adequately
investigate before deciding to file suit, 2) the attorney's failure to introduce expert evidence
at trial, and 3) the low settlement offer.).
A client may also be liable for an attorney's malicious actions under principles of
agency. Nyer v. Carter, 367 A.2d 1375 (Me. 1977).
68 See generally Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (fear of frivilous suits
unjustified in light of tools available). For application in RICO cases, see WSB Elec. Co. v.
Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate System, 103 F.R.D. 417, 420-21 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 imposed for frivolous RICO claim based on picketing);
Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531, 539 (11th Cir. 1983) (bad faith counsel fee award in
civil RICO appeal); King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (bad faith
counsel fee award in civil RICO suit). Frivolous defenses to valid RICO and other claims
may also be made the subject of sanctions. Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987,
990-92 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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nity fails to fully utilize these rules and procedures. 69 The solution
to meritless litigation lies not in imposing additional requirements
for establishing plaintiff's prima facie case but in using existing
rules and procedures to discourage such litigation. If the existing
rules are inadequate, the appropriate solution would be to reform
the remedies, not redraft RICO, because the problem of meritless
actions would extend beyond RICO to all civil actions.70 .
Critics have cited the increased burden on the federal judiciary
workload as another problem associated with civil RICO. 7' The in-
creased workload, however, cannot justify a judicial restriction of a
statute. Such an approach requires legislative action. The
Supreme Court recognized this basic principle in refusing to reject
consumer class actions under section 4 of the Clayton Act: 72 "We
must take the statute as we find it. Congress created the treble
damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging
private challenges to antitrust violations . . . . [I]t is the clear re-
sponsibility of Congress to provide the judicial resources necessary
to execute its mandates." 73
Similarly, Congress created the treble damage remedy of civil
RICO to encourage private challenges to racketeering activity.74 It
is, therefore, Congress' responsibility to provide the means to ac-
commodate the litigation its legislation fosters. Judicial redrafting
of RICO to reduce workload is inappropriate. 75
69 See Report of the Proceedings of theJudicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 21-22, 1983,
at 56 (existing tools used to reduce meritless litigation are sufficient, but perhaps not fully
understood or utilized).
70 Frivolous cases should be treated as exactly that, and not as occasions for funda-
mental shifts in legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for
speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if they are inadequate to protect petition-
ers from vexatious litigation, then there is something wrong with those proce-
dures, not with the law ....
Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 2012 (1984). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct.
3194, 3215 n.30 (1984) ("[A flood of frivolous lawsuits] is not sufficient to justify ajudicial
modification of the requirements of law.").
71 See "RICO" Running Amok in Board Rooms, supra note 2, at 20 ("Trial judges, horrified
at the prospect of yet another wave of lawsuits to increase their caseload, have at times
displayed notably acrobatic reasoning to throw out RICO charges.").
The Second Circuit, in Sedima, pointed to the recent increase of civil RICO cases, but
conceded that altering court workload is not within its judicial power. 741 F.2d at 487.
That the prior criminal conviction requirement would significantly reduce the number of
civil RICO actions, however, could not have escaped the court's notice. See notes 78-79
infra.
72 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (class action by retail customers
against manufacturers of hearing aids for antitrust violations).
73 Id. at 344 (emphasis in orginal).
74 See, e.g., Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1169
(5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(RICO was designed to permit private civil suits by a company forced to pay bribes or
kickbacks of any kind.).
75 See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents 457 U.S. 496, 512 n.13 (1982) (The burden im-
[Vol. 60:566
NOTES
The Sedima court's requirement of a RICO defendant's convic-
tion as a prerequisite to a private civil action also constitutes an
inappropriate restriction on private access to the court. Because of
this requirement, a private plaintiff may be denied his day in court
where: 1) the defendant is acquitted on the grounds of insufficient
evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 2) the de-
fendant is acquitted because of procedural flaws in the criminal
trial;76 3) the defendant is granted immunity from prosecution; 4)
the defendant enters a beneficial plea to an offense that is not re-
lated to RICO;7 7 5) the defendant is granted amnesty; 6) the gov-
ernment decides not to prosecute because the defendant is willing
to turn State's evidence; or 7) the grand jury does not indict be-
cause of insufficient evidence or defective proceedings. In these sit-
uations, persons injured by the defendant are barred from seeking
restitution by matters not related to the validity of their claims for
relief. The determination of who can recover under civil RICO
should not depend on prosecutorial errors or decisions, matters
wholly unrelated to the merits of the civil action.
According to the Sedima court, Congress did not intend that
RICO create a broad civil cause of action. 78 Even so, the Second
Circuit's effort to narrow the statute is itself too broad. Requiring a
prior criminal conviction reduces a statute's civil counterpart to a
trivial remedy. An examination of the number of civil and criminal
actions filed in federal courts each year in the areas of antitrust and
securities illustrates this result.
In the antitrust area, 1,200 civil actions are filed each year,
while only 74 criminal actions are brought. Under securities and
related laws, 3,000 civil actions are filed each year, while only 26
criminal actions are brought.79 Consequently, if a prior criminal
posed on federal courts by actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is "not sufficient to justify a
judicial decision to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction.").
76 The suppression of evidence obtained illegally by the government might preclude a
criminal conviction. The failure to obtain a conviction would also preclude the victim from
bringing suit in a civil action. In short, the prior criminal conviction requirement would
have the effect of extending the impact of the exclusionary rule to private plaintiffs. Such
an extension of the exclusionary rule to civil actions would be inconsistent with current law.
See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3490 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply
in civil deportation hearings); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 43, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483,
255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1964) (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921))
("[The fourth amendment] was not intended to be a limitation upon other than govern-
mental agencies.").
77 In fact, prosecutorial discretion had been exercised in Sedima. Defendants were
charged with grand larceny and agreed to plead guilty to violations of New York's business
record statute. Brief for Respondents' at 3 n.4, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985).
78 741 F.2d at 487.
79 See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 121,
164, 314 (1983).
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conviction requirement was introduced in the antitrust or securities
area, it would virtually end the usefulness of the civil remedies
under those statutes. A similar result could well be forecast under
RICO. Congress could not have provided a civil right of action and
intended it to be available in so few situations.
Moreover, the prior criminal conviction requirement will likely
prejudice the criminal justice system. Requiring a prior criminal
conviction gives the criminal RICO defendant a powerful incentive
to plea bargain for an offense not related to RICO to avoid the civil
consequences of a RICO-related conviction."0 Further, the require-
ment gives a victim planning to sue under civil RICO the incentive
to perjure himself in the criminal proceeding. Even if a victim-wit-
ness does not lie, his credibility is subject to attack in the criminal
proceeding because his prospect of receiving treble damages de-
pends upon the conviction of the defendant. Consequently, fewer
convictions under RICO and RICO-related offenses may be ob-
tained under the Sedima rule. In addition, requiring a prior criminal
conviction imposes pressure on prosecutors because the opportu-
nity for RICO victim recovery depends on the institution and suc-
cess of the government's case. Thus, the problems8' inherent in
the Second Circuit's prior criminal conviction requirement will
have a detrimental effect on the criminal justice system that cannot
be ignored.
In summary, because the Sedima requirement of a prior crimi-
nal conviction is not supported by the language or legislative his-
tory of RICO, analogous civil actions implicating criminal activity,
or policy considerations, the requirement should be rejected.
II. Burden of Proof
Among other elements of a civil RICO action, a private plaintiff
must prove that the defendant engaged in conduct constituting at
80 The A.B.A. voiced its concern over the fact that the enhanced criminal penalties of
RICO provide the potential for plea bargaining abuses by the government. See Report to
the House of Delegates, 1982 A.B.A. SEC. GRIM. JUST. REP. 3, 16 (Jan. 1982). The prior
criminal conviction requirement, as a condition precedent to civil recovery, further en-
hances that possibility of abuse.
81 Consideration must also be given to timing of the statute of limitations and bars
against splitting claims for relief. In most civil actions, the statute of limitations begins to
run from the time of the wrong. Accordingly, it is likely that the criminal prosecution will
not be completed by the time the traditional statute of limitations period has expired. If the
statute of limitations ran from conviction that rule would defeat the purpose of the statute
of limitations itself. RICO defendants in a civil action would be litigating claims years after
the wrong occurred. Finally, the plaintiff with a RICO claim and a traditional cause of
action would be whipsawed between the need to file his suits at different times. See Luebke
v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (improper to split RICO
and state claim for relief). For a general discussion of the statute of limitations as applied to
RICO, see Goldsmith, Time Bars Under RICO, in 3 RICO: THE SECOND STAGE Q (1984).
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least two predicate offenses within ten years.8 2 In the absence of a
prior criminal conviction, the issue arises as to what standard of
proof the plaintiff must establish that the defendant committed the
criminal activity.8 3 Should the burden be by a preponderance of
the evidence, 84 or by clear and convincing evidence?85 Or should
the plaintiff be required to prove the criminal activity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt?86 The Sedima court suggested that the proper stan-
dard is beyond a reasonable doubt.8 7 Other federal courts of
appeals have held, however, that a preponderance standard of
proof should be applied in civil RICO actions. 88 While the text of
RICO is silent regarding burden of proof,89 the legislative history,
analogous civil actions, and policy considerations establish that the
proper standard is preponderance of the evidence.
A. Legislative History
Traditionally, what measure of proof should be applied is a
question left to courts. 90 The issue, however, is first a matter of
legislative intent.9' An examination of RICO's legislative history
reveals several bases for determining that Congress intended a pre-
82 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). See note 5 supra. RICO may also be violated by the
collection of an unlawful debt, which need not be subject to criminal sanctions. See Durante
Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, No. 84-7221, slip op. (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1985).
83 The term burden of proof applies in different contexts. It refers to the burden of
going forward with evidence. It also refers to the burden of persuasion. MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 336 (Cleary ed. 1984). This note deals with the burden of persuasion.
84 See, e.g., Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State Farm
Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676-77 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Pames
v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Heinold Commodi-
ties, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311,313-14 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell
Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
85 Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
86 Although no case has applied the standard beyond a reasonable doubt in civil RICO
cases, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that its application might be appropriate. See
Haroco Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[R]equiring private RICO plaintiffs to prove at trial the elements of a section 1962 viola-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt could address some of the legitimate concerns about unfair
stigmatization of defendants as 'racketeers' and other abuses of RICO's criminal dimen-
sions through civil proceedings.").
87 741 F.2d at 501-02.
88 Alcorn County, Miss. v. United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1170-
71 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974) cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
89 Six state versions of RICO expressly set forth burden of proof in a civil suit. Five
states provide for a preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof in a civil suit.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314 (1978 and West Supp. 1984-85); IND. CODE ANN. 34-4-
30.5-2 (Bums Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 12.1-06.1-05 (Smith Supp. 1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1605(2) (Smith Supp. 1983); WASH.1REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.100(9)
(West Supp. 1985). Wisconsin requires proof to a reasonable certainty in a civil proceed-
ing. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.86(5) (West Supp. 1984-85).
90 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982).
91 Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96 n.10 (1981).
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ponderance of the evidence to be the standard of proof applicable
in civil RICO actions. First, during hearings on RICO, key spon-
sors and supporters of the civil action explicity stated that the stan-
dard of preponderance of the evidence would apply in civil RICO
actions. 92 In addition, other references in the legislative history to
"procedural equality," 93 "lesser standard of proof,"94 and "easier
standard of proof" 95 support this standard. Second, because Con-
gress modeled RICO on the antitrust statutes96 which require a
preponderance of the evidence,97 it may be inferred that Congress
intended the same standard to apply in RICO. Third, Congress ex-
pressly classified RICO as remedial, instead of penal.98 Remedial
actions generally require the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard.99 Finally, Congress enacted RICO to supplement the existing
federal and state laws that Congress deemed inadequate to protect
victims of racketeering. 00 The Supreme Court noted that an inad-
equacy of such laws in the area of securities fraud was the height-
92 Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
519-20 (1970) (statement of Congressman Sam Steiger) ("innovative ... civil procedures
and remedies [of Title IX, with their proof] by a preponderance of the evidence"). See also
Measures Relating to Organized Crime; Hearings on S.30, S.994. . .Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 388 (1969) (state-
ment of Assistant Attorney General) ("by the lesser standard of proof, i.e., by a preponder-
ance of the evidence").
93 Organized Crime Control: Hearings on A.30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings] (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan) ("Since these civil sanctions would be remedial
rather than punitive . .. [there would be] procedural equality."). Sen. McClellan's com-
ments are entitled to "weight" because he is a sponsor of the legislation. Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980). See also Hearings, at 664 (remarks of Congressman Richard
H. Pofi) ("[T]itle IX is really in two parts, one criminal and one civil. The burden of proof
under the civil remedy section, section 1964, is much less than it would be under the crimi-
nal section .... "). Congressman Poff's statements should also be entitled "weight" be-
cause he has been noted as the "manager of the bill." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 593 (1981).
94 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.- 126 (1969) (letter of Deputy Attorney
General).
95 116 CONG. REC. 35,313 (1970) (statement of Congressman Joseph A. Minish).
96 S. REP. No. 617, supra note 5, at 81; H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 56-60
(1970).
97 See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 307-11 (1971); South-East Coal
Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 778 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983
(1971).
98 84 Stat. 947 (1970) ("The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effec-
tuate its remedial purposes."); S. REP.-No. 617, supra note 5, at 81-82 (1969) ("[T]itle IX, it
must be again emphasized, is remedial rather than penal.").
99 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 339 (Cleary ed. 1984).
100 84 Stat. 923 (1970). See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981)
("[T]he very purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Fed-
eral Government to address a large and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that
existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the problem, which was of
national dimensions.").
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NOTES
ened standard of proof required by common law fraud 10' To apply
a heightened standard of proof in civil RICO would defeat Con-
gress' purpose in filling voids present in existing laws.
B. Analogous Civil Actions Imputing Criminal Activity
Part I of this note concluded that requiring a prior criminal
conviction in RICO civil actions departs from modem actions that
require proof of conduct constituting a crime.' 0 2 Similiarly, this
section concludes that requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in civil RICO actions would also depart from modem civil actions
that require proof of conduct constituting a crime by a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 10 3 Although English courts and early
American decisions once required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in civil actions implicating criminal conduct, examination of
the English and early American history of the rule reveals why the
rule does not apply in modern civil actions and should not apply in
civil RICO actions.
At a time when death was the punishment for nearly all crimes,
English law established the reasonable doubt rule to mitigate this
severity.' 0 4 Because of a peculiar procedural structure, early Eng-
lish courts required proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue
of crime in civil actions. 10 5 Private citizens were allowed to bring
civil actions against an individual prior to a criminal prosecution
against the same person for the same offense. If the private citizen
prevailed in the civil action, the defendant often was immediately
prosecuted for the criminal offense without intervention of a grand
jury.10 6 As the criminal law was reformed and fewer crimes merited
the death penalty, English courts began to restrict the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to criminal proceedings. 0 7
Early American courts differed on the application of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt in civil actions imputing criminal activity.
Some jurisdictions never applied the doctrine.10 8 Some courts ap-
101 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (securities laws
require a standard of preponderance of the evidence in civil actions) ("Indeed, an impor-
tant purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the
available common law protections .... ").
102 See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text.
103 See notes 111-19 infra and accompanying text.
104 Groom, Proof of Crime in a Civil Proceeding, 13 MINN. L. REV. 556, 560-61 (1929).
105 Early English courts applied a criminal standard of proof in actions to recover fire
insurance proceeds where the defendant pleaded arson as a defense, Thurtell v. Beaumont,
1 Bing 339, 130 Eng. Rep. 136 (1823); in actions for libel charging forgery, Chalmers v.
Shackell, 6 C. & P. 475, 172 Eng. Rep. 1326 (1834); and in actions for slander charging
bigamy, Wilmett v. Harmer, 8 C. & P. 695, 173 Eng. Rep. 678 (1839).
106 Groom, supra note 104, at 557-58.
107 Id. at 561.
108 Id. at 567 n.49 (Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachu-
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plied the doctrine only in narrow areas. 09 Other courts applied the
doctrine for a short time, until statutory or judicial abrogation. 1 0
In most jurisdictions, preponderance of the evidence prevails
as the standard of proof applicable in the following civil actions that
impute crimes: libel or slander actions where the defense alleges
that the plaintiff committed the crime;"' actions on insurance poli-
cies where the defense is arson a12 or theft; 1 3 wrongful death ac-
tions; 114 actions under treble damage legislation;" 15 actions to
recover a debt where the defense is that the debt was incurred in an
illegal gambling transaction;" 16 and actions for breach of contract
where the defense is bribery."t 7 Similarly, courts have held that
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia).
109 Id. at 567 n.48 (Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, South Carolina). For example, lli-
nois required the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to prove commission of a
crime in a civil action only when: 1) the action was other than divorce or bastardy proceed-
ings, actions to recover a penalty, or libel or slander actions; 2) where the crime would
constitute a felony; 3) where the crime was charged in the pleadings; and 4) where it was
charged against a party to the action. Id. at 575.
110 Id. at 567 n.47 (Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Pennslyvania, Ten-
nessee, Wisconsin). See, e.g., Elliot v. Van Bruen, 33 Mich. 49, 50-51 (1875) (assault &
battery with attempt to ravish) ("There is no rule of evidence which requires a greater
preponderance of proof to authorize a verdict in one civil action than in another, by reason
of the peculiar questions involved.").
One commentator has suggested that those American courts that applied the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in civil actions did so for one of two reason. Either American
courts were blindly following English precedent or they were confusing this burden with
the "two-witness rule." The two-witness rule required two witnesses or one witness and
corroborating circumstances to sustain a conviction of perjury. Some courts applied the
two-witness rule in civil actions in libel or slander based on perjury. Id. at 557.
111 See, e.g., Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Harley, 100 Ga. App. 387, 390, 111 S.E.2d
259, 263-64 (1959) (defense of truth of statement in newspaper that police shooting was
"murderous" required proof by a preponderance of the evidence); Auto West, Inc. v.
Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 291 (Utah 1984) (defense of truth of statement that plaintiff embez-
zled funds required proof by a preponderance of the evidence).
112 See, e.g., Dean v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 453 N.E.2d 1187, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983); Godwin v. Farmers Ins. Co., 129 Ariz. 416, 418 (App.), 631 P.2d 571, 573 (1981);
Rist v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 376 So.2d 113, 113 (La. 1979).
113 See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850, 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Weir
v. Central Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 194 Iowa 446,449, 189 N.W. 794, 795 (1922); Garner v. New
Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 200 S.W. 448, 449 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918).
114 See, e.g., Ory v. Libersky, 40 Md. App. 151, 159-60, 389 A.2d 922, 928 (1978); Con-
testible v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36, 40 (Mo.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 68 (1962).
Cf UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(e) (1983) (Absent conviction, a court may deter-
mine by a preponderance of the evidence whether a killing was felonious and intentional
for purposes of determining the effect of the homicide on intestate succession, wills, joint
assets, life insurance, and beneficiary designations.).
115 See, e.g.,James v. Brinks & Erb, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 414, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
116 See, e.g., Israel v. Selman, 263 Ill. App. 351, 356, (1931). Cf Hodoh v. United States,
153 F. Supp. 822, 824 (N.D. Ohio 1957) (In a civil action to recover excise tax assessed on
illegal wagering activities, the taxpayer's claim that he was not engaged in the business of
wagering required proof by a preponderance of the evidence.).
117 See, e.g.,Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 170 N.J. Super 334, 361, 406 A.2d
474, 485 (1979).
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civil actions under various federal statutes that impute criminal ac-
tivity, including antitrust'1 8 and securities" 9 laws, require only a
preponderance of the evidence.
The sheer number of civil actions imputing criminal activity
without a higher burden of proof reflects the view that the rule of
preponderance of the evidence in civil actions is better-reasoned.
The life and liberty interests at stake in a criminal trial warrant the
presumption of innocence and heightened standard of proof. The
presumption of innocence and heightened standard of proof are
not used in a civil proceeding because the interest at stake is only
pecuniary.1 20 Accordingly, the defendant's pecuniary interest in a
civil RICO action merits no more than the traditional standard of
proof applied in civil proceedings, proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The Sedima court's suggestion that, absent conviction, the issue
of criminal conduct in a civil action would have to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt substantially departs from the rules appli-
cable to most other civil actions.
C. Policy Considerations Concerning Stigma
In Sedima, the Second Circuit's position that the stigma of be-
ing labelled a "racketeer" justifies the imposition of a heightened
standard of proof ignores two important points. First, if a defend-
ant fits the definition of racketeer, the stigma that attaches to him is
warranted.' 2 1 Second, the fear of that stigma properly deters care-
118 See, e.g., Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 311 (1971) (Sherman Anti-
trust Act); South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 773 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971) (antitrust laws in general).
119 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (private action
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344, 355 (1943) (government action under the Securities Act of 1933).
120 See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1913) (quoting Roberge v. Burnham,
124 Mass. 277, 278 (1878)).
The rule of evidence requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt is generally appli-
cable only in strictly criminal proceedings. It is founded upon the reason that a
greater degree of probability should be required as a ground ofjudgment in crimi-
nal cases, which affect life or liberty, than may safely be adopted in cases where
civil rights only are ascertained.
See Watson v. Adams, 187 Ala. 490, 507, 65 So. 528, 533 (1914) (wrongful death)
("Great as the love of money may be in some human beings, it cannot be presumed that to
be held liable for damages is, to the ordinary man, the equivalent of the impending, unless
diverted, exaction of his freedom or his life .... ").
The Court, however, has applied a heightened standard of proof in certain civil pro-
ceedings involving particularly important individuals' interests or rights. See, e.g., Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982) (action to terminate parental rights); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (involuntary civil commitment proceeding); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 361-68 (1970) (juvenile delinquency proceeding); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.
276, 285-86 (1966) (deportation).
121 Worried about the prejudicial impact on judges and juries resulting from the label of
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less as well as fraudulent business practices.
The Sedima court, focusing on the "racketeer" stigma, rea-
soned that Congress must have intended wilful violation of laws,
such as securities, to be proven by a heightened standard of proof.
The court asserted that allowing wilful violations to be proven by a
mere preponderance of the evidence could subject a director of a
national corporation to "racketeering" charges, treble damages,
and attorneys' fees for two misstatements in a proxy solicitation. 22
True, one does not normally associate a director in a national
company with the image of the typical "racketeer." Under the dic-
tionary definition of "racketeering," however, someone who uses
fraud to his commercial advantage is a racketeer.' 23 Thus, a direc-
tor in a national company who benefits from a fraudulent proxy
statement or even from the infringement of a trademark 124 would
be properly labeled a "racketeer."
In other civil actions implicating criminal activity where the law
holds a defendant liable on a preponderance of the evidence, the
defendant is blackened with the stigma of the imputed crime. 125
For example, a defendant liable for wrongful death may be labeled
a "murderer," or a plaintiff who fails to recover insurance proceeds
due to a defense of arson may be labeled an "arsonist." Surely, the
impact of being labelled a "racketeer" is no more damaging.
The stigma associated with business people found to be "rack-
eteers" under civil RICO may also be viewed in a positive light.' 26
"racketeer," the House of Delegates of the A.B.A. recommended to Congress that the word
"criminal" replace "racketeer" in RICO. Report to the House of Delegates, supra, note 80
at 4.
It has been argued, however, that use of this type of euphemism in the law makes
officials reluctant to enforce the law and causes violators to rationalize their conduct. See D.
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLES MONEY 102 (1952); Blakey, supra note 5, at 250 n.41.
122 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499.
123 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1871 (15th ed. 1966) defines
"racketeer" as "use of fraud or intimidation in extorting money or commercial or political
advantage."
124 See Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 396 (2d Cir.
1965) (Lumbard, C.J.) (trademark infringement litigation: defendant labeled by court as a
"commercial racketeer").
125 See notes 111-19 supra and accompanying text.
126 One English authority on evidence has argued that protection of reputation was the
foremost reason for requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for any action charging
criminal activity. P. TAYLOR, EVIDENCE § 112 (8th ed. 1887). This view has been criticized
because had damage to reputation been a purpose of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it
would have been extended to all civil actions, for the resolution of most civil actions, in fact,
affects the reputation of the litigants.
What could be more damaging to reputation than the proof of a charge of unchas-
tity, illegitimacy, criminal conversation, contagious disease, insolvency, use of in-
toxicating liquors to excess, exercise of undue influence, and the like? Yet, in
breach of promise cases in which chastity becomes an issue, proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt has never been required. The same is true of actions for criminal
conversation; slander or libel proceedings charging disease, venereal or other
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This stigma, coupled with the imposition of treble damages, pro-
vides strong incentive for added care in business transactions. For
example, in a recent lawsuit, the plaintiff claimed that a bank that
charged an individual borrower a higher "prime rate" than the
prime rate charged to commercial borrowers violated civil RICO. 127
This lawsuit motivated many banks to amend their loan documents
to avoid similar misrepresentations. 128 To avoid RICO lawsuits,
banks now are urged not to use the term "prime rate" in individual
loan documents unless they intend to charge individual borrowers
the same rate charged to commercial customers.
Arguably, the threat of civil RICO performs a valuable watch-
dog function over "legitimate" businesses as well as organized
crime. This role is especially important at a time when other orga-
nizations designed to perform that function are apparently losing
their effectiveness. Public accounting firms, traditional outside
checks on improper business conduct in America's corporations,
have been subject to a recent barrage of litigation concerning audit
failures. 129 This has prompted congressional scrutiny into the
question of whether competitive cost pressures and the desire to
expand consulting services have diminished the independence and
effectiveness of auditiors.130 Moreover, the SEC has been criticized
kind; voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, or other proceedings af-
fecting credit.
Grooms, supra note 104, at 561.
127 Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985).
128 A Lawsuit Tests What "Prime Rate" Really Means, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1983, at 73
("[I]n response to similar suits, many banks have changed their loan forms to avoid defin-
ing interest rates in terms of how much they charge their most favored borrowers."); Suit
Tests Prime's Definition, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1984, at Y27, col. 3 ("By now, most banks have
changed their loan agreements, either by using a new term, such as "posted rate" instead of
prime rate, or by redefining the prime rate."). For an analysis of the use of RICO in cases
of prime-rate discounting, see Note, Prime-Rate Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO. LJ. 1885 (1984).
One commentator stated that the simplest and best way to avoid RICO claims is to take
more care in drafting loan documents. He warns banks not use the term "prime rate"
unless they mean "the lowest commercial interest rate available at a particular time and
place" and urges banks to state the rate, if possible, or use such terms as "base rate" or
"published rate" to avoid misleading loan customers. Mannino, Prime Rate Overcharge Cases:
How to Exorcise the RICO Devil, 101 BANKING L.J. 196, 215 (1984).
129 SEC Charges ESM Auditor Received Total of $125,000 From Firm's Officers, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 21, 1985, at 2, col. 3 (SEC charged that the former partner of Alexander Grant & Co.
gave, in return for secret payments, unqualified opinions on false financial statements
showing the insolvent securities firm to be in sound financial condition. The collapse of
this securities firm led to the collapse of an Ohio savings and loan which triggered the
closing of 71 other Ohio thrift institutions); 3 Censured by S.E.C.for Audits, N.Y. Times, June
26, 1984, at Y29, col. 6 (auditors censured for knowingly issuing questionable auditing
reports); Uneasy Period for Andersen, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1984, at Y29, col. 3 (within two
months Arthur Andersen & Co. agreed to $65 million in out-of-court settlements).
130 Auditors Face U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at Y14, col. 6 (statement of Eli
Mason, Chairman of National Conference of C.P.A. Practitioners) ("there has been a
marked deterioration in professional behavior due to unscrupulous marketing practices,"
i.e. cutting prices to obtain a client); Congress Gives Auditors an Account of Their Shortcomings,
19851 NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
for failing to remedy this situation by failing to prosecute such
firms.' 3l If the organizations designed to keep their eye on corpo-
rate America are not effective, the threat of civil RICO may be
needed to keep "legitimate" businesses truly "legitimate."
In short, the threat of a RICO suit that deters corporate fraud
outweighs the harm that it may cause banks, accounting firms, and
other "legitimate" businesses sued under its provisions.
III. Conclusion
The language and legislative history of RICO do not support
the Second Circuit's creation of a prior criminal conviction require-
ment. This view is also supported by important policy considera-
tions and by analogous civil actions that require proof of a crime,
but not conviction. Accordingly, the Second Circuit's restriction of
civil RICO should be rejected.
A preponderance of the evidence standard should be applied
in civil RICO actions to prove the defendant committed predicate
crimes. The legislative history of RICO and analogous civil actions
requiring proof of a crime support this determination. More im-
portantly, however, is the threat of being found liable under RICO
by this lesser standard of proof. The "prime rate" case exhibits
that the threat of treble damages, attorneys' fees, and the "racket-
eer" stigma deter fraudulent business practices. Civil RICO should
be regarded as not only a device to combat organized crime but
also as an effective mechanism to guard against the wrongful prac-
tices of "legitimate" businesses.
Leigh Ann MacKenzie
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1985, at Y8, col. I ("Not only is the auditor paid by the client whose
financial statements the auditor must examine on behalf of the public, but accounting firms
have been expanding into sidelines such as management consulting, which require being
advocates for the client."). See generally Sorensen, Grove, & Sorenson, Detecting Management
Fraud: The Role of the Independent Auditor, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH
(1980).
131 Dingle, Congress Should Be the Watchdog, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1985, at F2, col. 3
("[The SEC] has taken a far too relaxed approach to its responsibilities."); Accounting Role
Seen in Jeopardy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at Y46, col. 1 (statement by Rep. Dingle, Chair-
man of the House Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations) (Di-
rect SEC enforcement actions "appear to result in what can properly be termed mere wrist
slaps, even when the firm is a repeat offender."). See also Fedders & Perry, Policing Financial
Disclosure Fraud: The SEC's Top Priority, 1984J. OF Acc'r. 58, 60 ("Because certain conduct
violates the federal securities laws does not mean that the commission must file charges and
seek to impose sanctions on the malefactor.").
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